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USING VALUATION-BASED DECISION MAKING TO
INCREASE THE EFFICIENCY OF CHINA’S PATENT
SUBSIDY STRATEGIES
William J. Murphy and John L. Orcutt

“Science and technology hold the key to China’s economic
prosperity and sustainable development.”
Former Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao1
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INTRODUCTION
China is working to increase its creation of indigenous
technological inventions and become a more technology-based
economy.2 New technologies create new products, new markets, new
processes for doing business, and even new industries, while improving
an economy’s overall efficiency and competitiveness. While China’s
economy has grown at an average annual rate of close to 10% over the
last three decades3—one of the highest periods of sustained economic
growth in history—that growth has not been fueled by indigenous
inventions. China’s ability to accumulate the technology needed to
support its economic growth has primarily come through technology
importation.4 Instead of relying on indigenous technology creation,
2 See e.g., NAT’L DEV. & REFORM COMM’N OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (NDRC),
THE OUTLINE OF THE ELEVENTH FIVE-YEAR PLAN FOR NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
DEVELOPMENT OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, at Chaps. 1 and 7 (2006), available in
English at http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/hot/t20060529_71334.htm [hereinafter Outline of Eleventh FiveYear Plan]; THE STATE COUNCIL OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, THE NATIONAL
MEDIUM- AND LONG-TERM PROGRAM FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT (2006–
2020)
(2006),
available
in
English
at
http://www.cstec.org/uploads/files/National%20Outline%20for%20Medium%20and%20Long%2
0Term%20S&T%20Development.doc [hereinafter Science and Technology Development Plan];
THE STATE COUNCIL OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, OUTLINE OF THE NATIONAL
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STRATEGY (June 5, 2008), available in English at
http://english.gov.cn/2008-06/21/content_1023471.htm [hereinafter The National IP Strategy];
STATE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICE (SIPO), NATIONAL PATENT DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY
(2011–2020)
(Nov.
11,
2010),
available
in
English
at
http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/business/SIPONatPatentDevStrategy.pdf [hereinafter
The Patent Strategy].
3 Arthur R. Kroeber, Why Financial Reform is Critical for China’s Growth, BROOKINGS
(2012), available at http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2012/03/19-china-financialreform-kroeber.
4 JOHN L. ORCUTT & HONG SHEN, SHAPING CHINA’S INNOVATION FUTURE: UNIVERSITY
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various government policies have sought to entice foreign businesses to
transfer their technology to China.5 China’s leadership has concluded
that its technology importation strategy has “run its course”6 and that
Chinese inventors need to play a greater role in the country’s economic
future.7
Encouraging Chinese inventors to obtain more patents plays a
major role in China’s policies to increase indigenous inventions.8
China’s National Patent Development Strategy (2011–2020)9 (the
Patent Strategy), for example, establishes specific, quantitative targets
for Chinese inventors to achieve by 2015. By that time, the Patent
Strategy calls for China to rank in the top two patenting countries as
measured by the number of invention-type patents10 granted to domestic
inventors.11 The Patent Strategy also calls for Chinese inventors to
double overseas patent applications from 2010 to 2015.12 It should come
as little surprise that China’s indigenous innovation policy encourages
Chinese inventors to obtain more patents as patents offer a powerful
market-based tool to incentivize the creation, development, and use of
technological inventions.13 By providing enforceable and transferable
property rights in an invention, patents help to motivate each step in the
inventive process—from the earliest stages of research and development
to the commercialization of the invention.
What is somewhat unique about China’s indigenous innovation
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER IN TRANSITION 174–75 (2010).
5 Id.; see also Cong Cao, Richard P. Suttmeier & Denis Fred Simon, China’s 15-Year
Science and Technology Plan, PHYSICS TODAY, Dec. 2006, at 38, 39, available at
www.levin.suny.edu/pdf/Physics%20Today-2006.pdf.
6 Cao, Suttmeier & Simon, supra note 5.
7 See e.g., Outline of Eleventh Five-Year Plan, supra note 2; Science and Technology
Development Plan, supra note 2; The National IP Strategy, supra note 2; The Patent Strategy,
supra note 2.
8 See infra Part I, Table 1.
9 The Patent Strategy, supra note 2.
10 China’s patent system provides for three types of patents: invention patents; utility patents;
and design patents. China’s Patent Law, Art. 2). China’s Patent Law is available in English at
http://www.lexisnexis.com/documents/pdf/20100211022732_large.pdf. Invention patents tend to
be the most valuable and technologically sophisticated of the three categories of patents; they are
roughly the equivalent to the United States’ utility patents, receive twenty years of protection
from the date of filing, and receive a thorough substantive examination. See China’s Patent Law,
Art. 39, 42. Utility model and design patents in contrast only receive ten years of protection from
the date of filing and are only subject to a preliminary examination. See China’s Patent Law, Art.
40, 42. Invention patents are typically more valuable than utility model and design patents, which
are sometimes derisively referred to as “petty” patents or “junk” patents. RICHARD P. SUTTMEIER
& XIANGKUI YAO, CHINA’S IP TRANSITION: RETHINKING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN
A RISING CHINA, NAT’L BUREAU OF ASIAN RESEARCH, NBR SPECIAL REPORT NO. 29, at 14
(July 2011).
11 The Patent Strategy, supra note 2, at 4 (Part III).
12 Id.
13 See WILLIAM J. MURPHY, JOHN L. ORCUTT & PAUL C. REMUS, PATENT VALUATION:
IMPROVING DECISION MAKING THROUGH ANALYSIS 23 (2012).
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policy, however, is its use of subsidies to encourage patent applications
and its recognition that such subsidy programs need to be carefully
designed in order to generate higher-quality patents.14 China has used a
number of crude tools, including patent fee subsidy programs, to
encourage patent applications for quite some time.15 The results of these
efforts have been mixed. On the one hand, patent applications by, and
patent issuances to, Chinese inventors have soared.16 As of 2010, there
were more than 1.8 million domestic patents in force in China.17 On the
other hand, the quality of a significant portion of these patents is
questionable.18 China’s patent policies, including its patent fee subsidy
programs, have encouraged inventors to obtain many patents, but not
necessarily many valuable patents.
The Chinese government has grown concerned that its patent fee
subsidy programs have not funded the most deserving patents, and thus
they no longer wish to spend public resources to promote low-value
patents. Instead, the government would prefer subsidy programs that
encourage the most deserving patents. The Patent Strategy reflects this
desire, as the fourth strategic focus of the Patent Strategy recognizes the
need to “[o]ptimize [China’s] patent subsidy policy and further define
the orientation to enhance patent quality.”19 This Article explains how a
disciplined and transparent valuation-based decision making process
14
15

The Patent Strategy, supra note 2, at 8 (Part IV.4).
See e.g., Willy Shih et al., Office of Technology Transfer—Shanghai Institutes for
Biological Sciences, Harvard Business School Case Study No. 9-611-057, 3–4 (2011):
Many . . . factors also drove up the number of patents in China, most notably, improper
uses of patent applications as required by the policies or rules of various governmental
agencies or academic institutions. For example, governmental funding agencies usually
required one or more patents to be filed at the end of a research grant period, which
caused many grant recipients to have to find something to file without even
considering the commercial value. In some universities or institutions, graduate
students can graduate only if they either publish a scientific paper or file a patent,
which caused some students to file junk patents in order to graduate. Other improper
uses included giving advantages to people who had patent applications when
evaluating for job promotions.
16 In 2010, Chinese inventors filed 293,066 invention-type patent applications and received
79,767 invention-type patent grants. 2011 CHINA STATISTICAL YEARBOOK ON SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY, NAT’L BUREAU OF STATISTICS, MINISTRY OF SCI. & TECH. 180–81 (2011). In
1995, by comparison, Chinese inventors filed only 10,018 invention-type patent applications and
received only 1,530 invention-type patent grants. Id.
17 Id. at 182.
18 See e.g., Mark Liang, Chinese Patent Quality: Running the Numbers and Possible
Remedies, 11 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 478, 482, 491–514 (2012); Henry Koda, The
Global Patent Race, 24 NO. 1 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 21, 22 (2012) (referencing quality
concerns expressed by others); Mark Cohen (speaking on a moderated panel), China’s Current
Intellectual Property Plan, Policies & Practices, 15 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 17, 28 (2011);
Joff Wild, Telling It How It Is, 48 INTELL. ASSET MGMT. 67, 72–73 (2011); Innovation in China:
Patents, Yes; Ideas, Maybe, ECONOMIST, Oct. 16, 2010, at 78, 78–79.
19 The Patent Strategy, supra note 2, at 8 (Part IV.4).
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can help the Chinese government design patent fee subsidy programs
that allocate funds more consistently to deserving patents. In addition,
this Article offers the outline of a practical valuation model the Chinese
government could use to filter patent fee subsidy requests.
I. CHINA’S INDIGENOUS INNOVATION POLICY AND ITS CALL TO
IMPROVE THE GOVERNMENT’S PATENT SUBSIDY POLICY
China’s current indigenous innovation policy can be traced back to
its 2006 National Science and Technology Plan (the 2006 Science and
Technology Plan). The Science and Technology Plan is embodied in
China’s Eleventh Five-Year Plan (2006–2010)20 and the accompanying
National Medium- and Long-Term Science and Technology
Development Plan (2006–2020).21 The 2006 Science and Technology
Plan makes clear that technological progress is to be the driving force
behind China’s future economic growth and calls for China to become
an “innovative nation” by 2020.22 To advance the intellectual property
initiatives from the 2006 Science and Technology Plan, China’s State
Council23 issued the National Intellectual Property Strategy (the
National IP Strategy) in 2008.24 And to implement the patent elements
of the National IP Strategy, China’s State Intellectual Property Office25
(SIPO) issued the Patent Strategy in 2010.26
Collectively, these three documents guide indigenous innovation
policy in China, which calls for China to reduce its dependence on

20 For an English-language summary of China’s Eleventh Five-Year Plan, see Outline of
Eleventh Five-Year Plan, supra note 2. Five-year economic plans were long the driving force for
China’s economy. When China became a planned economy in the early 1950s, it took to using
five-year plans to allocate China’s economic resources and efforts. GREGORY C. CHOW, CHINA’S
ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION 44 (2d ed. 2007). As China began to embrace a market-oriented
economic approach, five-year plans changed from being a strict resource allocation tool to
providing a method for announcing national priorities and key national projects. See What is the
Five-Year Plan?, CHINESE GOVERNMENT’S OFFICIAL WEB PORTAL (Apr. 5, 2006),
http://www.gov.cn/english/2006-04/05/content_245556.htm.
21 Science and Technology Development Plan, supra note 2.
22 Outline of Eleventh Five-Year Plan, supra note 2, Chap. 7.
23 The State Council is China’s chief executive and administrative body.

The State Council of the People’s Republic of China, namely the Central People’s
Government, is the highest executive organ of State power, as well as the highest organ
of State administration. The State Council is composed of a premier, vice-premiers,
State councillors, ministers in charge of ministries and commissions, the auditorgeneral and the secretary-general.
DAILY
ONLINE
(ENGLISH),
The
State
Council,
PEOPLE’S
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/data/organs/statecouncil.shtm (last visited Feb. 4, 2013).
24 The National IP Strategy, supra note 2.
25 SIPO is China’s version of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.
26 The Patent Strategy, supra note 2.
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foreign technology and increase domestic production of the
technological inventions that are needed to drive China’s economic
growth.27 One of the major goals in each of the 2006 Science and
Technology Plan, the National IP Strategy, and the Patent Strategy is for
Chinese inventors to obtain more patents.
Table 1
Patent Targets for Chinese Inventors in China’s 2006 Science and
Technology Plan, National IP Strategy, and Patent Strategy

2006 Science and
Technology Plan
Chinese inventors
will rank in the top
five countries in
receipt of inventiontype patents by
2020.28

National IP
Strategy (2008)
China will rank
among the advanced
countries in terms of
annual number of
patents granted to
Chinese inventors.29
Overseas patent
applications by
Chinese inventors will
greatly increase.30

Patent Strategy
(2010)
China will rank in the
top two patenting
countries as measured
by the number of
invention-type patents
granted to domestic
inventors by 2015.31
Overseas patent
applications by
Chinese inventors will
double by 2015.32

China’s government has implemented a number of policies and
initiatives to help achieve these targets. Many of these actions have
focused on improving China’s patent infrastructure, which should
indirectly increase the number of domestic patents by lowering the
administrative costs for obtaining patents. The Patent Strategy calls for
the government to make a number of patent infrastructure
improvements, including: enhancing SIPO’s capacity to examine
patents, which includes increasing the number of patent examiners and
developing more efficient examination procedures;33 making patent
information more accessible by establishing “a multi-level and multi27 See Outline of Eleventh Five-Year Plan, supra note 2, Chap. 7; Science and Technology
Development Plan, supra note 2, at 12 (Part II.2), 46–53 (Part VII), 54 (Part VIII.3); The National
IP Strategy, supra note 2, at 1 (Parts I(4), II.2(6)), 2 (Parts II.2(7)), III.2(11)–(12)), 4 (Part
V.1(40)); The Patent Strategy, supra note 2, at 8 (Part IV.4).
28 Science and Technology Development Plan, supra note 2, at 12 (Part II.2).
29 The National IP Strategy, supra note 2, at 2 (Part II.2(7)).
30 Id.
31 The Patent Strategy, supra note 2, at 4 (Part III).
32 Id.
33 Id. at 9 (Part IV.5).
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aspect information public service system for patents;”34 improving
administrative and judicial patent protection, with the goal of lowering
the cost of enforcing patent rights;35 accelerating development of a
patent service industry that involves “information retrieval, analysis,
early warning, data processing, database building, patent consultation,
transaction, trust, assets appraisal and pledge loans;”36 strengthening
patent management functions in government-controlled entities;37 and
making patents an integral part of China’s economic development
policy.38
In addition to these indirect efforts to boost domestic patenting
activities, the Patent Strategy also calls for a number of direct efforts.
The Patent Strategy, for example, calls for the Chinese government to
conduct a study to determine appropriate inventor rewards in
government-funded research projects39 and to provide preferential
policies, including tax incentives, to encourage businesses to produce
patents.40
One of the Patent Strategy’s most direct efforts to increase
domestic patent activity is the use of patent fee subsidies to encourage
patent filings. For more than ten years now, various levels of the
Chinese government have implemented patent fee subsidy programs to
cover costs associated with obtaining patents. In 1999, the Shanghai
municipal government implemented “Subsidization Measures of Patent
Fees in Shanghai.”41 Shanghai is not alone in this approach; numerous
local governments have employed similar programs.42 The early patent
subsidy programs appear to have focused primarily on subsidizing the
costs for filing patents in China.43 More recent patent fee subsidy
programs focus on subsidizing foreign patent application fees. For
example, SIPO operates a special fund44 to subsidize foreign patent
applications filed under the Patent Cooperation Treaty (the SIPO Patent

34
35
36

Id. at 11 (Part IV.8).
Id. at 9–10 (Part IV.6).
Id. at 11–12 (Part IV.9). The industry development may involve privatizing government
patent information service agencies. Id.
37 Id. at 7 (Part IV.3).
38 Id. at 6–7 (Part IV.2).
39 Id. at 8 (Part IV.4).
40 Id. at 7 (Part IV.2).
41 Wen Jiachun, Zhou Yongtao & Zhu Xuezhong, Research on Patent Fees Subsided by
Local Government in China, 2008 INT’L CONF. ON INFO. MGMT, INNOVATION MGMT & INDUS.
ENG’G 270 (2008).
42 See id.
43 See id.
44 Chinese Ministry of Finance Memo, Notice of the Ministry of Finance on Issuing the
Interim Measures for the Administration of Special Funds for Subsidizing Foreign Patent
Applications
(Aug.
28,
2009),
English
version
available
at
http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=7806 [hereinafter The Memo].
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Subsidy Program).45 The SIPO Patent Subsidy Program is restricted to
Chinese small- and medium-sized companies, public institutions
(including universities), and government research institutions.46
Successful applicants may receive funding to cover application fees,
examination, maintenance, and issuance fees, as well as patent agent or
attorney fees, search fees, and other related expenses incurred by the
patent agent or attorney.47 The SIPO Patent Subsidy Program subsidizes
these fees for up to five countries (or regions) at a level of up to Rmb
100,000 (roughly US$ 15,000) per country (or region).48
Evidently, the Chinese government has developed concerns that its
various subsidy programs are not subsidizing the right patents.49 While
not retreating from the use of patent fee subsidies, the fourth strategic
focus of the Patent Strategy states the need to “[o]ptimize [China’s]
patent subsidy policy and further define the orientation to enhance
patent quality.”50 The Chinese government is looking to deploy its
subsidy resources more efficiently to promote patent quality, rather than
just patent quantity.
II. SUBSIDY PROGRAMS BENEFIT FROM VALUATION-BASED
DECISION MAKING
Market failure is the typical justification for governments to
intervene in private market transactions.51 A market failure occurs when
some barrier or inefficiency in the market causes significant allocation
efficiencies.52 In the case of developing technological inventions and
obtaining patents, there are a number of well-documented market
failures. Two of the more commonly cited causes for market failures in
the inventive process (invention to market) are the free-rider problem
and the uncertainty problem.
The free-rider problem arises because the inventive process does
45 “The Patent Cooperation Treaty makes it possible to seek patent protection for an invention
simultaneously in each of a large number of countries by filing an ‘international’ patent
application. Such an application may be filed by anyone who is a national or resident of a PCT
contracting State. It may generally be filed with the national patent office of the contracting State
of which the applicant is a national or resident or, at the applicant’s option, with the International
Bureau of WIPO in Geneva.” Summary of the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) (1970), WORLD
INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/registration/pct/summary_pct.html (last
visited Feb. 7, 2013).
46 The Memo, supra note 44, Article 3.
47 Id. at Article 6.
48 Id. at Article 5.
49 The Patent Strategy, supra note 2, at 8 (Part IV.4).
50 Id.
51 THOMAS J. WEBSTER, MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS: THEORY AND PRACTICE 687 (2003).
52 See CHRISTINE GREENHALGH & MARK ROGERS, INNOVATION, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY,
AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 17 (2010).
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not generate an easily protectable good or service. Instead, it generates
knowledge, which suffers from a problem that economists refer to as
“free-riding.”53 It is inherently difficult to prevent others from copying
knowledge without paying the knowledge producer.54 “Knowledge
spillover” is another way to describe this problem. Private sector
research and development generates both “private returns”—returns for
which the knowledge producer is compensated—and “social returns”—
returns for which the knowledge producer is not capable of being
compensated. Numerous studies have shown that the social returns from
private-firm research and development investment can be substantial.55
Because firms cannot capture the full value of their inventive efforts,
the private sector is likely to underinvest in research and development.56
And patents appear to provide only a partial solution to this freerider/knowledge spillover problem.
The uncertainty problem is inherent to the inventive process.57
Inventions involve new technologies that may not work as planned or
may not scale to useful levels. They also lack a historical track record of
proven economic returns. This uncertainty makes judging new
technologies’ future performance particularly difficult. The increased
difficulty in projecting the future performance of inventions prevents
informed decisions as to whether (and how much) to invest in such
projects.
Such problems can create a considerable gap in the innovation
system that, if unaddressed, prevents the creation and
commercialization of an optimal level of technological inventions.
Economic theory suggests that well-designed and implemented
government subsidies can reduce the impact of these market failures by
counterbalancing the private sector’s underinvestment in research and
development.58 But government subsidies present their own set of
problems. If the government is not capable of identifying which

53
54

MURPHY, ORCUTT & REMUS, supra note 13, at 104–05.
Knowledge can be described as being “nonrival” (i.e., it can be used by an infinite number
of people at the same time without depriving any person of its use) and only “partially
excludable” (i.e., it is difficult to exclude unintended parties from benefiting from ideas). Paul
Romer, Endogenous Technological Change, 98 J. OF POL. ECON. S71, S74 (1990).
55 Kenan Patrick Jarboe & Robert D. Atkinson, The Case for Technology in the Knowledge
Economy—R&D, Economic Growth, and the Role of Government, PROGRESSIVE POLICY
INSTITUTE POLICY BRIEFING 5 (June 1998); see also JOSEPH CORTRIGHT, U.S. ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION, NEW GROWTH THEORY, TECHNOLOGY AND LEARNING: A
PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE, REVIEWS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT LITERATURE AND PRACTICE,
NO. 4, at 7 (2001), available at www.rosecommunitydevelopment.org/New_Growth_Theory.pdf.
Because the original knowledge producer is not compensated for these social returns, they are
unlikely to serve as incentives for private research and development decisions.
56 See GREENHALGH & ROGERS, supra note 52, at 17–18.
57 Id. at 21.
58 See generally id. at 24–25.
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research and development projects should be subsidized and which
should not, valuable public resources will be wasted and the competitive
market for conducting research and development could be damaged.59
For purposes of this Article, we are not taking a position on
whether China’s patent subsidy programs will provide a net benefit to
China and its overall innovation system or whether they will cause a net
detriment. Instead, we are taking as a given that the Chinese
government will operate one or more patent subsidy programs. The
focus of this Article and its proposed solution is how to improve the
efficiency of such patent subsidy programs so that even if they turn out
to cause a net detriment to China’s overall innovation system, that
detriment is minimized. If the patent subsidy programs turn out to be
beneficial, such benefits can be maximized under the solution proposed
in this Article.
When the government decides to subsidize a private market
transaction, concerns justifiably arise that the government’s actions will
lead to wasteful resource deployment. This concern stems from
skepticism about the government’s competence (is the government
decision maker capable of consistently making good decisions?) and
motivations (will the government decision maker be corrupt?). In the
context of Chinese patent fee subsidy programs, the main question is:
will the Chinese government consistently be able to subsidize
applications for the most deserving patents, or will it regularly ignore
the most deserving patents and instead subsidize weak patents that do
not warrant patent application funding? Fortunately, there are a number
of relatively simple valuation techniques that can be employed that
would greatly facilitate the Chinese government’s allocation decisions
regarding patent fee subsidies. Employing these relatively simple
valuation techniques can improve the likelihood such subsidy programs
improve China’s indigenous production of valuable commercial
technology.
III. VALUATION-BASED DECISION MAKING
Every decision involves a value determination. When one
alternative is chosen over another, the decision maker has, either
consciously or subconsciously, valued the chosen decision higher than
the competing choices.60 If a company decides to acquire Asset A rather
than Asset B, the firm has determined the net benefits that will come
from owning Asset A are greater than if the company acquired Asset B.
59 Some of the risks to the competitive market for conducting research and development
include crony capitalism or collusive capitalism.
60 MURPHY, ORCUTT & REMUS, supra note 13, at 43.
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If the government decides to fund Program A and not Program B, the
government has decided the net benefits from Program A are greater
than for Program B.
Figure 1
Choosing Between Government Programs Based on
Net Economic Benefit

Decisions can be significantly improved by recognizing they can
be quantified, compared, and evaluated.61 The decision maker can
determine the value of the decision in terms of a quantifiable, common
measurement—usually money—and then make an apples-to-apples
comparison to alternatives based on the common measurement.62 Take
the example of the above government funding decision between
Programs A and B. Assume the primary purpose of the programs is to
create jobs for purposes of general economic development. If the
decision maker can project (a) the economic benefit that will come from
each program’s job creation and (b) the cost of funding and running
each program, then she can then choose the program that will generate
the greatest net economic benefit (see Figure 1). For those decision
makers who purposefully or inadvertently try to avoid valuation
analyses, their avoidance efforts will not be successful.63 Every decision
involves choosing one option over another, which, by definition, means
the decision maker valued the option chosen as better than the other
option along some dimension (e.g., creates more jobs or generates more
profits). Whether or not the values used or implied in making the
decision are logically derived, consistent or sufficiently encompassing is
another matter and one that can be addressed by proactively
approaching the decision making process with a disciplined valuation
methodology.
Up to this point, few would disagree with the basic premise that
61
62
63

Id. at ix.
Id. at 43.
Id. at 4.
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valuation analysis improves decision making. We seldom meet
resistance with the theoretical benefits that valuation can generate.
Where we meet resistance, however, is from those who are skeptical
about valuation’s practical application. That line of critique questions
how valuation can practically be implemented into basic decision
making. In fact, there are two primary reasons valuation analysis may
appear too onerous for general use in broader decision making: (1)
belief that valuation analysis (in particular for patents) is too
complicated and expensive to perform and requires valuation experts to
do it properly; and (2) concern that valuation analyses are likely to be
inexact and flawed.64
The first concern is simply wrong. While expert guidance and
assistance can be beneficial, most valuation techniques (even those for
patents) are within the understanding of anyone with a willingness to
learn and an open mind.65 The second concern is a bit more subtle.
Valuation is not a one-size-fits-all endeavor.66 There is no single
approach to valuing decision alternatives. Moreover, there is no single
approach for how much to invest in a particular valuation effort or what
level of accuracy is required for the effort to be worthwhile. For some
decisions, the valuation effort needs to be quite extensive and extremely
accurate to be useful. For other decisions, a less extensive and less
accurate effort could still be beneficial to the decision maker.
Sometimes just the benefits generated by the disciplined thought
process that valuation requires can justify a valuation effort.
A.

Using a Relative Value Technique to Guide Chinese Patent Fee
Subsidy Programs67

In the case of a patent fee subsidy program, each funding decision
tries to determine whether to invest public funds to bring about a given
patent. In 2010, 293,066 domestic applications for invention-type
patents were filed with SIPO.68 Even if only 0.1% of those patents were
eligible for a subsidy program, 3,000 patents would still need to be
evaluated. For that size decision, a less extensive and less accurate, but
still logical and disciplined, valuation approach is all that is realistic.
64
65
66
67

Id. at 53.
Id.
Id. at 54.
The relative value technique proposed in this paper is an example of an analytic hierarchy
valuation process and is based on a valuation technique proposed in MURPHY, ORCUTT &
REMUS, supra note 13, at 58–65. The relative value technique proposed in this article is a specific
application of the more general technique described in that book.
68 2011 CHINA STATISTICAL YEARBOOK ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, supra note 16, at
180.
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Fortunately, there are facile and inexpensive valuation techniques that
could be used to provide the Chinese government with better
information for determining which patents to subsidize (see Figure 2).
While we do not have enough information about China’s various patent
fee subsidy programs to craft a truly detailed valuation model for the
specific programs, we do have enough information to outline a general
technique that provides an idea of how disciplined valuation analysis
could be employed to improve subsidy decisions.
Figure 2
Using Valuation as an Allocation Filter

The recommended technique is a two-stage, three-dimensional
valuation exercise that we refer to as a “relative value” technique (see
Figure 3). This technique is not meant to establish definitive values for
the various patents seeking a subsidy, which would be very expensive
and cumbersome. Instead, the technique seeks to do two things. First, it
identifies and organizes the available information that will affect the
future value of the patents along three separate dimensions: (1) the
economic importance to China of the patent; (2) the legal strength of the
patent; and (3) the disruptive technology potential the patent offers.
Second, the technique combines the information in a manner that allows
government decision makers to make informed projections about each
patent’s ability to generate social returns that justify the subsidy.
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Figure 3
Diagram of the Relative Value Technique

At the most basic level, the value of a patent depends on an
analysis of both its legal and economic elements. Legal factors that
affect the value of a patent may include the breadth of the claims,69 the
presence (or absence) of blocking patents,70 whether the patent covers
the critical competitive elements of the invention, whether there is any
close prior art,71 how courts are currently interpreting patents of this
type,72 and the receptivity of foreign jurisdictions to the patent. On the
69 The legal definition of the invention is set forth in the claims. The claims are, in effect,
similar to a deed for real estate in that they set the legal boundaries of the invention. Claims
drafting has a major effect on the value of patent rights. If the claims are too narrow, substantial
value will be left on the table as other parties may be able to easily invent around the patent. If too
broad, however, the claim may be invalidated in a subsequent proceeding.
70 A blocking patent is a patent that blocks a rights holder on a different patent from
exploiting the different patented invention without a license to the blocking patent.
71 In order to be eligible for a patent, an invention must be “new” or “novel.” In the United
States, for example, this novelty requirement is contained Section 101 of the U.S. Patent Act. 35
U.S.C. § 101. The term “prior art” refers to the materials (or references) that define the universe
of available knowledge that is “pertinent to the novelty inquiry.” ROGER E. SCHECHTER & JOHN
R. THOMAS, PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 74 (2004).
72 For example, the value of a “software” patent may depend on how courts are interpreting
the rules surrounding the patentability of software. China’s Patent Law, for example, excludes
rules and methods for mental activities from patent protection. China’s Patent Law, Art. 25(2).
China’s Guidelines for Patent Examination 2010 (the Guidelines) explain that rules and methods
for mental activities are not patentable because they do not involve any technical characteristics.
The
Guidelines,
Chap.
1,
§ 4.2,
available
in
English
at
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/zlsqzn/sczn2010eng.pdf. The Guidelines go on to provide a long list of
activities that are considered to be rules and methods for mental activities, including “computer
programs per se.” Id. The term “computer programs per se” is generally considered to capture
software, but the ability to obtain “software patents” can be a bit more subtle due to the definition
of “computer programs per se” in the Guidelines and how it is differentiated from “computer
program-related inventions.” ORCUTT & SHEN, supra note 4, at 118.
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economic side, the subsidy’s justification should derive from the social
returns the given patent is expected to provide China and its taxpayers.
Factors that are likely to generate such social returns may include the
size of the future potential market, the strategic importance of the
technology sector to China and its economy, job-creation potential,
whether the technology compliments other Chinese technology sectors,
whether the technology reduces environmental degradation, and the
proven track record of the inventor.
A third dimension that we recommend for the relative valuation
analysis is what we refer to as “disruptive technology potential.”
Clayton Christenson used the term “disruptive technology” in a seminal
1997 book73 to describe unanticipated technologies that displace
established technologies and competitors.74 Classic examples of
disruptive technologies include the semiconductor replacing vacuum
tubes in the computer industry, digital image and storage chips
replacing film and tape in the photography and recording industries, and
desktop computers replacing mainframe computers as the primary
source of computing power for most businesses. Christenson’s thesis for
the success of disruptive technologies can be reduced to five basic
points:75 (1) At first, disruptive technologies tend to underperform
established technologies along the performance dimensions historically
valued by mainstream customers.76 (2) Disruptive technologies,
however, offer other features that a few fringe (and generally new)
customers desire.77 Disruptive technology offerings tend to be “cheaper,
simpler, smaller, and, frequently, more convenient to use.”78 (3) The
leading firms’ most profitable customers are not interested, and
73 Christenson’s “disruptive technology” work began with an article he co-wrote with Joseph
Bower. See Joseph L. Bower and Clayton M. Christensen, Disruptive Technologies: Catching the
Wave, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.–Feb. 1995, at 43. Christenson built on that work with a best-selling
book, which remains the seminal piece on disruptive technology. See CLAYTON M.
CHRISTENSON, THE INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA: WHEN NEW TECHNOLOGIES CAUSE GREAT FIRMS
TO FAIL (1997).
74 CHRISTENSON, supra note 73, at xiv–xviii. Christensen’s thesis of disruptive technology is
very Schumpeterian in nature. Economist Joseph Schumpeter developed a related concept more
than a half century ago the he referred to as “creative destruction.” JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER,
CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 83 (3d ed. 1950). A healthy economy is a dynamic
organism that is constantly in a state of change and renewal. Id. Innovation (the creative part) and
competition constantly revolutionize the company from within—“incessantly destroying the old
one, incessantly creating a new one.” Id. By seeking innovations to render their competitors
obsolete, innovators create new products, markets, processes for doing business, and even new
industries, while inefficient companies, products, and business methods are destroyed.
Established competitors, as well as entire industries, are forced out of business if they cannot
meet the increased competition, which causes a constant renewal of the economy.
75 This breakdown of Christensen’s thesis was motivated by Gerald J. Tellis, Disruptive
Technology or Visionary Leadership?, 23 J. PROD. INNOV. MANAG. 34, 34 (2006).
76 CHRISTENSEN, supra note 73, at xv.
77 Id.
78 Id.
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probably cannot even use, the disruptive technology when first
introduced.79 As a result, disruptive technology offerings are first
commercialized in emerging or insignificant markets and embraced by a
market’s least desirable customers.80 (4) While disruptive technologies
initially offer worse product performance, the technology improves until
it becomes performance-competitive in the mainstream market.81 (5)
Once the disruptive technology becomes performance-competitive, it
displaces the dominant technology because it more accurately targets
customers needs, including offering a better price.82
While disruptive technology potential is related to the economic
benefit factor, it is sufficiently different that we recommend treating it
as a separate factor. The economic benefit factor measures a
technology’s ability to succeed in the current market setting based on its
ability to interact with established technologies and business practices.
The disruptive technology potential seeks to measure the ability of a
technology eventually to displace established technologies and business
practices and create entirely new markets and practices. Because
disruptive technologies tend to underperform established technologies
in satisfying customers’ current demands, they risk generating a low
economic importance score and are easy to overlook when deciding
which patents to subsidize. As we will explain below, however,
disruptive technologies may be the patents that are most suitable for
government subsidies.83
B.

Mechanics of the Relative Value Technique

Complex decisions with multiple dimensions of analysis are
difficult to assess without a structure to guard against
oversimplification.84 Determining which patent subsidy candidates will
be most valuable to China depends on a considerable number of diverse
but interrelated factors. Without a proper valuation structure, collecting,
analyzing, and interpreting the relevant information is beyond the
capabilities of most humans. To compound matters, few, if any,
government decision makers have the combined legal, economic, and
technical expertise that is required to truly understand a patent subsidy
candidate’s potential to benefit China. Finally, the scope of the task
limits the amount of resources the government can spend on valuing any
79
80
81
82
83
84

Id. at xvii.
Id.
Id. at xvi.
Id. at xvi, xxii.
See infra Part III.B.2.
See generally MURPHY, ORCUTT & REMUS, supra note 13, at 67–87.
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one patent subsidy candidate.
One method to improve decision making in this type of
challenging environment is to disassemble the problem into its
individual parts, apply focused logic and analytical rigor to each part,
and then reassemble the individual parts back into a coherent solution
that can be evaluated at the aggregate level.85 This disassembly process
helps the decision maker to identify the individual factors that
collectively generate the overall value of the item being valued,
generate a better understanding of those individual factors and how they
interact to generate value, organize the information so that it can be
dealt with in a manageable way, and identify and eliminate extraneous
information that is not important to the valuation process.86 Disassembly
also allows multiple evaluators with different areas of expertise to all
contribute to the decision-making process.87 Legal experts can provide
information about the legal qualities of the patent without having to
worry about a lack of economic or technology expertise. Economists (or
business experts) can provide focused information about the patent’s
economic qualities and technology experts can provide focused
information about the quality of the technology. The reassembly process
brings these disparate judgments back together so that an informed
decision can be made based on the collective knowledge and expertise
of the various evaluators.
The relative value technique that we propose provides an
inexpensive but powerful disassembly method that: (a) collects the
combined legal, economic, and technical information needed to make an
informed patent subsidy decision; (b) analyzes that information in a
clear, consistent, and transparent manner; and (c) logically assembles
that information into a final result that can be readily understood using
the visual power of a cluster map.88 We propose conducting the relative
value technique in two stages:
Stage one consists of a preliminary analysis of patent subsidy
candidates based on their legal and economic factors. Stage
one provides an initial filtering of the candidates to identify
which candidates clearly merit a subsidy, which candidates
clearly do not merit a subsidy, and which candidates require
further analysis.
Stage two applies a second filter to those patent subsidy
85
86
87
88

Id. at 69.
Id.
See id. at 85–86.
Reduced to its core, valuation analysis has three elements: (1) collecting information
inputs; (2) employing valuation techniques that translate the information input into value results;
and (3) interpreting the value results. Id. at 67. The relative value technique that we are proposing
performs each of these three functions.
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candidates that require further analysis. Stage two, which is
when the disruptive technology potential analysis is
introduced, seeks to identify highly speculative candidates that
have so much upside potential they warrant a subsidy.
1.

Stage One—Analyzing Economic Importance and Legal Strength

Stage one of the relative value technique reduces a patent subsidy
candidate’s various economic and legal dimensions to x and y
coordinates that can be plotted on a two-axis chart (see Figure 4) that
we refer to as a “patent cluster map.” The relative value technique
allows the valuator (or valuators)89 to place each patent subsidy
candidate on the chart and then use the visual power of the patent
cluster map to easily compare the various candidates across their
economic and legal dimensions.
Figure 4
Stage One—Plotted Relative Value of a Single Patent Subsidy
Candidate on a Patent Cluster Map

89 We recommend having different groups evaluate the different dimensions. Legal experts
should evaluate the patent subsidy candidates’ legal qualities, economic experts should evaluate
their economic quality, and technology experts should evaluate their technology quality. Since the
various assessments are later combined for a holistic analysis, using lawyers, economists, and
technology experts in the initial valuation provides an excellent method for obtaining their
differing areas of expertise.
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Determine the Economic Importance of the Patent to China

In order to determine the economic importance of the patent
subsidy candidate to China, we suggest preparing a uniform “economic
importance score sheet” (see Table 2). This uniform score sheet seeks to
identify and quantify the various economic factors that are likely to
provide social returns to China. The factors listed in Table 2 are simply
illustrative. A much more detailed analysis would be required to
determine the ideal factors. To obtain more information from the
exercise, we recommend weighting the importance of the factors rather
than treating all factors as equal. The combined weights of all factors
must add up to 1 (or 100 percent). Each factor is scored from 0-to-5 and
then multiplied by that factor’s weight to yield a factor value. All the
factor values are added up to yield a single economic importance value
for the patent subsidy candidate, which will be the x value on the
relative value chart. The uniform score sheet will be used for each
patent subsidy candidate uniformly (hence the name “uniform” score
sheet) so that apples-to-apples comparisons can be made among the
candidates.
Table 2
Example of a Completed Economic Importance Score Sheet
Economic Factor that Generate
Social Returns for China
Size of the future potential market
Strategic importance of the
technology sector
Job creation
Compliments other Chinese
technology sectors
Reduces environmental degradation
Proven track record of the inventor
Total of weights must add up to 1.0

=

Calculated
Factor Value
0.4

3

=

0.6

x

4

=

1.2

0.1

x

4

=

0.4

0.1
0.2
1.0

x
x

2
4

=
=

0.2
0.8

Weight
(0-1)
0.1

x

Score
(0-5)
4

0.2

x

0.3

x

=

Add all calculated factor values and plot an x-axis

3.6

b. Determine the Legal Strength of the Patent
The legal strength of each patent subsidy candidate must also be
evaluated. The process is similar to that used to assess economic
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importance. We suggest preparing a uniform “legal strength score
sheet” (see Table 3). The legal strength score sheet should include the
legal factors that affect the ability of a patent holder to profit from the
patent, with the factors listed in Table 3 being simply illustrative. As
with the economic factor score sheet, the legal strength factors should
be weighted, with the combined weights adding up to 1 (or 100
percent). Each factor is scored from 0-to-5 and then multiplied by that
factor’s weight to yield a factor value. All the factor values are added up
to yield a single legal strength value for the patent subsidy candidate,
which will be the y value on the relative value chart.
Table 3
Example of a Completed Legal Strength Score Sheet
Legal Factors that Impact Patent’s Strength
Broad claims
No blocking patents
Patent covers critical competitive elements
No close prior art
Impact of relevant court decisions
Foreign jurisdictions’ receptivity to the patent
Total of weights must add up to 1.0

Weight
(0-1)
0.2
0.2
0.3
0.1
0.1
0.1
1.0

x

Score
(0-5)
3
2
3
1
4
4

Add all calculated factor values and plot a y-axis

=

Calculated
Factor Value
0.6
0.4
0.9
0.1
0.4
0.4

2.8

c. Making the Various Determinations
The question is frequently asked: what is the best way to choose
the various factors and weights when creating the uniform score sheets?
There is no single approach for making those choices. In fact, the
process of discussing and determining the factors and weights is, in and
of itself, a highly useful endeavor for the decision maker. We
recommend against simply delegating this task to outside experts,
although their assistance may be helpful. These discussions lead to a
deeper understanding and appreciation of the relevant factors and how
they interact to generate the social returns that drive the purpose for the
subsidies in the first place.
A related, and equally relevant, question is: who should evaluate
and score the patent subsidy candidates? We do not know enough about
the strengths and capabilities of the various Chinese government
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agencies that provide patent fee subsidies to make a concrete
suggestion. But we caution against assigning the task to evaluators with
a singular perspective. Unfortunately, many patent evaluators approach
patent valuation from either a legal perspective or an economic
perspective. If the evaluator is a patent attorney, there is a significant
risk any patent valuation will overemphasize the legal aspects of the
patent valuation and underemphasize the economic aspects. If the
valuator has an economic background, the valuation is likely to suffer
from the opposite bias. One benefit of the relative value technique is the
ease with which it can collect and combine the wisdom from legal,
economic, and technology experts and thereby allow each to contribute
to the valuation exercise. Ideally, the economic importance score sheets
will be scored by economic and technology experts and the legal
strength score sheet will be scored by patent lawyers.
d.

Using a Patent Cluster Map to Provide an Initial Subsidy
Determination

Once a collection of patent subsidy candidates is plotted on the
patent cluster map, the results can be analyzed. Figure 5 provides an
example of a plotted stage one patent cluster map. The government
decision maker could employ the results in a number of ways. Our
recommendation is to use the patent cluster map as an initial filter that
identifies which candidates clearly merit a subsidy, which candidates
clearly do not merit a subsidy, and which candidates require further
analysis. This approach allows the government decision makers to strike
a balance in how much to invest in the subsidy determination process.
Obvious “yes” and “no” determinations can be made without the need
to commit any further resources. For those candidates that do not fall
within an obvious “yes” or “no” category, additional resources can be
expended to determine if a subsidy is justified.
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Figure 5
Example of a Plotted Stage One Patent Cluster Map

We suggest dividing the patent cluster map into three areas to
cover the automatic inclusion zone, the automatic exclusion zone, and
the further analysis zone (see Figure 6).
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Figure 6
Example of a Plotted Stage One Patent Cluster Map that Is
Divided into Automatic Inclusion, Automatic Exclusion,
and Further Analysis Zones

1. Automatic Inclusion Zone. Figure 6 shows a congregation
of patent subsidy candidates in the upper right-hand section of
the map that are both economically and legally strong. If the
goal of the patent subsidy program is to fund high-quality
patents, these candidates should be funded so long as there are
sufficient funds in the patent subsidy program. These
candidates represent high-quality inventions that are
economically important to China and can be protected with
strong patents. The “Automatic Inclusion Zone” set forth in
Figure 6 is simply illustrative. Where to draw the line for
automatic inclusion will depend on a number of factors, not
least of which is the amount of money that is dedicated to the
subsidy program.
2. Automatic Exclusion Zone. Figure 6 also shows a
congregation of patent subsidy candidates in the bottom
sections of the map that are legally weak. Valuable inventions
do not always translate into valuable patents. If, for example,
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there is close prior art that may result in a future invalidation
proceeding, or if the patent’s claims are so narrow that
competitors can easily invent around the patent, then a
valuable invention may not generate a valuable patent. Because
the goal of the patent subsidy program is presumably to
encourage valuable “patented” technology, these candidates
that are legally weak should be automatically excluded without
further analysis. As was the case for the Automatic Inclusion
Zone, the “Automatic Exclusion Zone” set forth in Figure 6 is
simply illustrative.
3. Further Analysis Zone. A number of patent subsidy
candidates do not fall within either the Automatic Inclusion
Zone or the Automatic Exclusion Zone. For these candidates
that fall within the “Further Analysis Zone,” a second stage
filter is required. It is in stage two that we recommend
considering the candidate’s disruptive technology potential.
The patent cluster map’s graphical representation of the multifactor
analysis allows the ultimate government decision makers to analyze
hundreds, if not thousands, of patent subsidy candidates simultaneously.
On a single sheet of paper (or a single computer screen), government
decision makers can pull together the expert opinions of multiple
evaluators and see how a huge number of patents compare to each other
on a relative basis. This simultaneous analysis should make it easier for
the decision makers to delineate the borders of the Automatic Inclusion
Zone and the Automatic Exclusion Zone.
The graphical representation also makes it easy to spot trends that
may be correctable if recognized. For example, Figure 7 shows a patent
cluster map with a substantial clustering of patent subsidy candidates in
the lower right quadrant. That means a lot of economically valuable
technology is being protected by very weak patents. That kind of
problem can be corrected if appreciated and clearly communicated to
the relevant inventor and legal communities. In the alternative, these
economically strong, but legally weak, patent subsidy candidates may
be good targets for other support policies because of their economic
importance to China. Being able to inexpensively identify this potential
should itself be very valuable to Chinese policymakers.
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Figure 7
Patent Cluster Map Allows Government Decisions Makers
to Spot Trends

2.

Stage Two—Incorporating Disruptive Technology Potential into
the Analysis

For patent subsidy candidates that fall in the Further Analysis
Zone, we recommend conducting a second filtering stage that identifies
and measures one or more characteristics the Chinese government
wishes to promote. For example, the stage two filtering process could
focus more specifically on the potential job impact or environmental
impact of the candidate’s technology. While there is any number of
potential stage two filters, we believe that measuring the disruptive
technology potential of the patent subsidy candidates is an ideal
characteristic on which to focus the stage two filtering process. Patents
for disruptive technologies may be those that are most suitable for
government subsidies.
To begin with, the private markets are likely to underfund research
and development for disruptive technologies. Because the leading firms’
most profitable customers are generally not interested, and probably
cannot even use, most disruptive technologies when first introduced,90
90

Id. at xvii.
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established firms are unlikely to fund disruptive technology research
and development efforts. As Christensen notes, “[t]he highestperforming companies . . . have well-developed systems for killing
ideas that their customers don’t want. As a result, these companies find
it very difficult to invest adequate resources in disruptive
technologies.”91 Moreover, disruptive technologies also pose funding
problems for professional private investors (e.g., venture capital firms)
because disruptive technologies suffer from extreme uncertainty
problems.92 It is “impossible to predict with any useful degree of
precision how disruptive products will be used or how large their
markets will be.”93 Not surprisingly, this heightened uncertainty
negatively impacts the willingness of investors to invest.94
Market failure is the typical justification for governments to
intervene in private market transactions,95 and there certainly appears to
be a market failure in the case of research and development funding for
disruptive technologies. When coupled with the high upside potential
that disruptive technologies offer to a country, the case for trying to
reduce this underfunding problem is particularly strong. By creating
entirely new markets and new ways of doing business that render the
economy more competitive and more efficient, disruptive technologies
can be among the most attractive technologies to a country. Therefore, a
method to include the most promising of this group for patent subsidy
could allow China to sow the seeds, however speculative, for future
considerable rewards.
In effect, we are suggesting that China take a “portfolio theory”96
type of approach to its patent subsidy program and diversify its portfolio
of subsidized patents with a group of high-risk, but potentially highreturn patents. Modern portfolio theory has instructed generations of
financial asset managers that they can maximize returns by diversifying
investments.97 China could use a similar lens for constructing its
portfolio of patent subsidies. The country is making investments on
91
92
93
94
95
96

Id. at xix.
Id. at 158.
Id.
PAUL A. GOMPERS & JOSH LERNER, THE VENTURE CAPITAL CYCLE 157–58 (2d ed. 2004).
WEBSTER, supra note 51, at 687.
Modern portfolio theory is generally traced back to Harry Markowitz’s 1952 paper. See
Harry M. Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77 (1952).
97 In 1990, the Nobel Prize for Economics was awarded to Markowitz, Merton Miller (also
famous for his contribution to the Black-Scholes option pricing model), and William Sharpe (who
is most noted for his work on the Capital Asset Pricing Model, or CAPM). The major insight of
modern portfolio theory is that measurement of the risk of an entire portfolio, and not just the risk
of individual investments, is key to managing the return of the investments in the portfolio.
Markowitz and those who followed have shown that by informed balancing of the various classes
of investments, one can construct a diversified portfolio with a certain risk that can achieve a
higher average return than the associated risks and returns of individual investments it contains.
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various assets with an expectation of generating social returns that
exceed the investment. As with financial assets, diversifying the patent
subsidy portfolio to include some higher-risk/higher-reward patents and
some lower-risk patents (e.g., they have more predictable benefit
expectations) should generate superior results. Those candidates that fall
within the Automatic Inclusion Zone after stage one (see Figure 6)
should tend to be lower-risk patents, while those candidates that qualify
after the stage two disruptive technology analysis should tend to be
higher-risk/higher-reward patents.
To assess the disruptive technology potential of the patent subsidy
candidates that fall in the Further Analysis Zone, we suggest using a
second patent cluster map. For this second patent cluster map, the x
value on the relative value chart will represent a patent subsidy
candidate’s disruptive technology potential while the y value will
represent the candidate’s legal strength score.
To calculate a patent subsidy candidate’s disruptive technology
potential, we suggest preparing a uniform “disruptive technology score
sheet” (see Table 4). The disruptive technology score sheet should
include the factors that are significant to measuring disruptive
technology potential, with the factors listed in Table 4 being simply
illustrative. As with the economic factor and legal strength score sheets,
the disruptive technology factors should be weighted, with the
combined weights adding up to 1 (or 100 percent). Each factor is scored
from 0-to-5 and then multiplied by that factor’s weight to yield a factor
value. All the factor values are added up to yield a single disruptive
technology value for the patent, which will be the x value on the relative
value chart.

Murphy_Orcutt_FINAL, 4 26 2013 (Do Not Delete)

2013

4/26/2013 12:14 PM

VALUATION-BASED DECISION MAKING

143

Table 4
Example of a Completed Disruptive Technology Score Sheet
Factors Indicative of Disruptive
Technology Potential
Transformative product or service
Ability to create a new market
Technology is cheaper, simpler,
smaller, and/or more convenient to use
Potential to address initially a smaller
niche market that is currently ignored
by leading firms
Potential to motivate the creation of a
significant number of startups
Total of weights must add up to 1.0

Weight
(0-1)
0.3
0.2

x

Score
(0-5)
3
4

=

Calculated
Factor Value
0.9
0.8

0.2

3

0.6

0.2

4

0.8

0.1

2

0.2

1.0

Add all calculated factor values and then determine
if value exceeds cut-off value

3.3

A candidate’s disruptive technology score should be interpreted in
connection with its legal strength. Because this is a “patent” subsidy
program, the legal strength of the potential patent remains highly
relevant for the stage-two analysis. China is not just investing in
technology, China is investing in “patented” technology that will
provide its people with the additional benefits that are associated with
patents.98 Since the legal strength of the candidate was already
measured during stage one, the information can easily be incorporated
into this second stage analysis. The candidate’s legal strength score
from stage one is brought forward to become its y value for the stage
two patent cluster map.
The stage two candidates can then be plotted on the patent cluster
map and the results analyzed. Figure 8 provides an example of a stage
two plotted patent cluster map. Once again, the government decision
maker could employ the results in a number of ways. One possibility is
to use the stage two patent cluster map as a final filter to identify which
candidates merit a subsidy. Figure 8 shows a possible cutoff for
determining which candidates would be subsidized based on a stage two
analysis.

98 For a thorough discussion of the various direct and indirect economic benefits that come
patent rights, see MURPHY, ORCUTT & REMUS, supra note 13, at 103–17.
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Figure 8
Example of a Plotted Stage Two Patent Cluster Map

C.

Additional Benefits of the Suggested Valuation Process

One of the benefits of our proposed valuation process is the ease
with which it can be updated or modified. Because each of the evaluated
factors and final scores is represented as a numerical projection, the
government decision makers can go back later and measure the
accuracy of past scoring and weighting decisions and the importance of
the various factors. China could then improve its subsidy performance
over time by reevaluating the accuracy of its past decisions on a regular
basis.
Another benefit of our proposed valuation process is the verifiable
decision-making record that it leaves behind. If the decision making
results are regularly published, the transparent results can provide useful
knowledge to inventors and their lawyers who will have an incentive to
develop patented technology that is more likely to be subsidized. Since
these should be precisely those patents that the Chinese government has
strategically decided are more promising, the program should evolve
into less of a filter to eliminate less desirable patents and more of an
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information system to provide clear incentives to inventors to submit
more promising patent subsidy candidates, thus eliminating the waste of
producing worthless patents.
Finally, government subsidy programs invariably raise concerns
that the government agency will make funding decisions based on
politics, favoritism, or corruption, rather than merit. A transparent
verifiable decision-making record should also help to reduce those
concerns. Moreover, dispersing the evaluation process among various
experts makes it more difficult for candidates or government officials to
use strategic behavior to skew funding decisions towards undeserving
patent subsidy candidates.
CONCLUSION
The Chinese government has stated the need to “[o]ptimize
[China’s] patent subsidy policy and further define the orientation to
enhance patent quality.”99 This Article offers the outline of a practical
valuation model the Chinese government could use to do just that. The
two-stage, three-dimensional relative value technique proposed in this
Article would allow the Chinese government, without the need for a
significant resource commitment, to filter patent fee subsidy requests
and allocate public funds to the most deserving patents.
Whether operating a patent fee subsidy program is an effective use
of public funds for promoting innovation remains an open question,100
and is not something this Article tries to address. We are not taking a
position on whether China should operate a patent subsidy program. But
if China is going to operate such a program, our proposed valuation
model will allow China to do so more efficiently and effectively. When
the government decides to subsidize a private market transaction,
concerns justifiably arise that the government’s actions will lead to
wasteful resource deployment. In the context of Chinese patent fee
subsidy programs, the question is: will the Chinese government
consistently be able to subsidize applications for the most deserving
patents, or will it regularly ignore such patents and instead subsidize
patents that do not warrant patent application funding? The valuation
model we propose in this Article should reduce such concerns. More
specifically, the model should significantly improve the Chinese
99
100

The Patent Strategy, supra note 2, at 8 (Part IV.4).
David Kappos, while Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director
of the United States Patent and Trademark Office, called on the academic community to explore
that specific question. David J. Kappos, A Public Discussion on Strategies for Engaging China,
Fordham IP Conference—Understanding China’s New Environment for Intellectual Property
(Apr. 11, 2011), available at http://www.uspto.gov/news/speeches/2012/kappos_fordham.jsp.
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government’s allocation decisions regarding patent fee subsidies and
thereby improve the likelihood that such subsidy programs improve
China’s indigenous production of valuable commercial technology. The
relative value technique that we propose provides an inexpensive but
powerful method that: (a) collects the combined legal, economic, and
technical information needed to make an informed patent subsidy
decision; (b) analyzes that information in a clear, consistent, and
transparent manner; and (c) logically assembles that information into a
final result that can be readily understood using the visual power of a
cluster map. Moreover, the technique does not require expert valuators
to implement. Instead, the technique seeks to improve the Chinese
government’s decision making by offering a very practical solution for
taking advantage of the disparate legal, economic, and technological
expertise the government already possesses.
Finally, while this Article’s proposed valuation model was
motivated by China’s patent fee subsidy program, it is not limited to
that program. Numerous countries, including Australia, Belgium,
Canada, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Philippines, Spain, and the
United Kingdom have launched similar patent fee subsidy programs.101
This Article’s proposed valuation model would be applicable to any of
these other patent fee subsidy programs. In addition, it could be used for
filtering and awarding research and development funding grants and
other types of government technology funding decisions.

101 Federico Munari & Liang Xu, Are Patent Subsidies for SMEs Effective? Empirical
Evidence
from
Italy
(Sept.
8,
2011),
available
at
http://www.epip.eu/conferences/epip06/papers/Parallel%20Session%20Papers/MUNARI%20Fed
erico.pdf; Managing Patents Costs: An Overview, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG.,
http://www.wipo.int/sme/en/documents/managing_patent_costs.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2013).

